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GUIDES TO HARMONIZING SECTION 5 OF THE
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ACT WITH THE
SHERMAN AND CLAYTON ACTS*

S. Chesterfield Oppenheimf

I.

THE PROBLEMS PLACED IN CONTEXT

T

HIS topic is a constellation of antitrust highlights. Within the
past five years the Federal Trade Commission has ventured
into borderlands of its claim of jurisdiction under section 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act1 in testing the scope of section 5
itself and its relation to the Commission's jurisdiction under the
Sherman and Clayton Acts.2
My inquiry into these interrelated problems was sparked by
the challenging observations of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in his
dissenting opinion in Motion Picture Advertising Service Company:

"I am not unaware that the policies directed at maintaining effective competition, as expressed in the Sherman Law,
the Clayton Act, as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act,
and the Federal Trade Commission Act, are difficult to formulate and not altogether harmonious."3
The Justice also referred to "the legal puzzles these statutes
raise." He stressed the judicial review obligation of the Court to
• This article is based on a paper originally delivered before the American Bar Asrodation Section of Antitrust Law. It has been revised to include developments since its
publication in the Report of that Section, 17 A.B.A. ANrrrR.usr SECTION REP. 231 (1960).
t Professor of Law, University of Michigan. - Ed.
1 The pertinent provision reads: "Unfair methods of competition in commerce, and
unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce, are hereby declared unlawful." In this
paper we are not concerned with the Commission's jurisdiction over deceptive acts or
practices as such. The jurisdictional problems discussed are confined to restraints of trade
and monopolistic practices of the Sherman Act type, discriminatory practices under the
Robinson-Patman Act, and the practices covered by §§ 3 and 7 of the Clayton Act, and
their relation to § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.
2 See also, Howrey, Utilization by the FTC of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act as an Antitrust Law, 5 ANrrrR.usr BULL. 161 (1960); Rahl, Does Section 5 of
the FTC Act Extend the Clayton Act1 5 ANnTRusr BULL. 533 (1960).
8 FTC v. Motion Picture Advertising Service Co., 344 U.S. 392, 405 (1953).
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avoid rubber-stamping the Federal Trade Commission either in
leaving it "at large" on questions of fact or in determinations of
law which are ultimately for the courts to decide. "It is also incumbent upon us," he continued, "to seek to rationalize the four
statutes directed toward a common end and make of them, to the
extent that what Congress has ·written permits, a harmonious body
of law."
In Automatic Canteen/ the same Justice again emphasized the
Court's "duty to reconcile" interpretations of the Robinson-Patman Act "with broader antitrust policies that have been laid down
by Congress" when alternative constructions are "fairly open."
There is no doubt that Mr. Justice Frankfurter's observations
underscore the dilemma frequently faced by antitrust counselors
in their attempt to solve the "legal puzzles" in the body of antitrust
laws to which the Justice referred. Antitrust appears to have
swinging doors. The antitrust counselor may be successful in absolving his client from liability under one antitrust law only to
find the same client faced in the same situation with the legal
hazard of violation of another antitrust statute.
In 1955 the Attorney General's Antitrust Committee Report
pointed out that:
"Adherence to the essence of antitrust leaves us not unmindful of the risks in oversimplifying the variant statutory
formulations and their judicial construction. The three
major statutes-the Sherman, Federal Trade Commission,
and Clayton Acts-have been interpreted and enforced . . .
with varying degrees of autonomy. And the Sherman Act itself has gone through several cycles of judicial construction." 5
Until recently Federal Trade Commission complaints have
generally segregated and identified offenses arising under each of
these major antitrust enactments. No jurisdictional problem concerning the appropriate statute is raised in the mass of Commission
complaints brought under the Clayton Act where the charges are
particularized and confined solely to Clayton Act offenses indisputably within the coverage of that act. Similarly, resort to section
5 generally raises no jurisdictional issue where the charges readily
identify conventional Sherman Act offenses clearly within the
Commission's authority.
4Automatic Canteen Co. v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61 (1953).
IS REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL CoMMITI'EE

LAws 2 (1955).
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In the past few years, however, complaints, Hearing Examiner
Initial Decisions and Commission rulings have caused concern that
section 5 is regarded as a congressionally-designed catch-all provision for conduct embracing hybrid and duplex charges without
regard to the jurisdictional limits of these several statutes.
Perplexities of rationalization and harmonization of the policies expressed in this body of principal antitrust laws come into
focus in several main categories of jurisdictional questions. Section
5 has been used to attack practices of the type covered by sections
2, 3 and 7 of the Clayton Act but not deemed by the Commission
to be within the purview of that statute. Respondents have contended that this jurisdictional deficiency bars a section 5 proceeding. Likewise, jurisdictional issues are presented when the Commission complaints combine in a single section 5 count, or in
several counts under section 5 and specified Clayton Act counts,
charges which appear to disregard or gloss differentiations in jurisdiction, statutory standards and tests of violation. There may also
be the question whether section 5 is being used as a substitute or
alternative provision for attacking practices directly covered by the
Clayton Act.
These jurisdictional issues are of primary concern in this paper.
Beyond that, it is also necessary to synthesize the Commission's
statutory authority in the conventional types of cases since the purpose is to suggest guides for harmonization of the three statutes.
To what extent can this reconciliation be made within the existing
framework of these antitrust laws? To what extent is congressional
amendment required to eliminate what is believed to be at odds
·with the common goal of maintaining effective competition under
national antitrust policy?

!I. STATUTES IN PARI MATERlA AND EVOLUTION OF JUDICIAL
INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 5
In seeking to rationalize and harmonize the Sherman, Federal
Trade Commission and Clayton Acts, as Mr. Justice Frankfurter
defined this aim, a backdrop of statutory interpretation and judicial interpretations of section 5 is essential to inquiry into congressional intention.
The fundamental proposition is that statutes related to the
common end of maintaining effective competition should be construed together as interlaced expressions of national antitrust policy. This canon of statutory interpretation, known under the des-
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ignation statutes in pari materia,6 applies where, as here, the
generality of the standards of the Sherman Act and section 5 must
be accommodated to the specific provisions of the Clayton Act.
This process of statutory construction, however, is not "an exercise in logic or dialectic." Canons of construction are axioms of
experience and not rigid rules of law.7 Construing statutes in pari
materia requires the Commission and the courts to probe below
the surface of the statutory words to capture the meaning of the
public policy of these three statutes fairly within congressional
intention. Determination of whether there is ambiguity or conflict
between a general and a specific statutory provision is not a matter
of abstraction. Statutory words are vessels into which frequently
many meanings can be poured. Search for congressional intention
may range from clear mandates to elusive weasel words. If "what
Congress has written permits" alternative constructions, ambiguity
or apparent conflict should be resolved in making the three major
statutes a unified and harmonious national antitrust policy.
We do not dwell here on the details of the familiar legislative
history of these statutes.8 The Supreme Court has passed upon
much of this legislative history in its interpretations. It is indisputable that the Federal Trade Commission and Clayton Acts were
designed to supplement the Sherman Act.9 It is equally clear that
the particularizations of the Clayton Act have the purpose of
counteracting the generality of the Sherman Act10 and section 5 of
the Federal Trade Commission Act by bolstering enforcement
against the specific transactions and practices singled out by Con6 See CRAWFORD, THE CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES §§ 231, 232 (1940); SUTHERLAND,
STATUTORY CoNSTRUcnoN §§ 5201-02 (3d ed. 1943). Cf. comment of Judge Learned Hand
in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 429 (2d Cir. 1945): "In
United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 •.• , a later statute in pari materia was considered to throw a cross light upon the Anti-trust Acts, illuminating enough even to override an earlier ruling of the court."
7Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 CoLUM. L. REv. 527,
529, 544 (1947).
s For this legislative background, see my UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICFS 624-28 (1950);
Howrey, supra note 2, at 161-64; HENDERSON, THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, ch. I (1924).
9FTC v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643 (1931).
10 In Motion Picture Advertising, supra note 3, at 405, Justice Frankfurter's dissenting
opinion recognized this: "The vagueness of the Sherman Law was saved by imparting to
it the gloss of history•••• Difficulties with this inherent uncertainty in the Sherman Law
led to particularizations expressed in the Clayton Act.••• The creation of the Federal
Trade Commission . . • made available a continuous administrative process by which
fruition of Sherman Law violations could be aborted."
Note that this merely refers to the Clayton Act as a supplement to the Sherman Act
and to § 5 as a means of curbing Sherman Act violations. To what extent § 5 supplements
the Clayton Act is a different question, as the text of this paper infra demonstrates.
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gress as evils to be curbed under that statute when the specified
adverse competitive effects are proved. Elementary also is the Supreme Court's interpretation that section 5's general phrasing sanctions the Commission's use of that provision as a flexible and expansive instrument not restricted to common law proscriptions or
previously adjudicated Sherman Act violations.11
It cannot be denied that the incipient violation doctrine vests
in the Commission authority to "nip in the bud" conduct which
might ripen into the consummated evils at which Congress aimed
in the Clayton Act. The Commission need prove only a reasonable
probability12 of the anticompetitive effects under section 2 (a) of
the Robinson-Patman Act and under sections 3 and 7 of the Clayton Act.
Confusing dicta of the Supreme Court,13 however, becloud the
reach of the Commission's zone of power under section 5 to strike
down incipient violations. When section 5 is used as a supplement
to attack traditional Sherman Act offenses, it is clear that the Commission may arrest such violations in their incipiency, since the
Sherman Act as such ordinarily reaches only actually achieved violations with the exception of proof of a specific intent to monopolize under section 2 of that act.14 But, as other ·writers have prop11 ITC v. R. F. Keppel &: Bros., 291 U.S. 304 (1934), changing the restrictive interpretation in ITC v. Gratz, 253 U.S. 421 (1920); ITC v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S.
441 (1922); Fashion Originators' Guild v. ITC, 312 U.S. 457 (1940); ITC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683 (1948); ITC v. Motion Picture Advertising Service Co., 344 U.S. 392
(1953). In the recent opinions of the majority and dissenting Commissioner Tait in Grand
Union Co., F.T.C. Dkt. 6973 (1960), there is no disagreement on this particular point.
12 The Commission has not shown any inclination to take advantage of the "reasonable
possibility" test as stated in the majority opinion in ITC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37
(1948).
13 Particularly in this passage from Mr. Justice Douglas' majority opinion in Motion
Picture Advertising (344 U.S. at 395):
"It is also clear that the Federal Trade Commission Act was designed to supplement
and bolster the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act - to stop in their incipiency acts and
practices which, when full blown, would violate those Acts, as well as to condemn as
'unfair methods of competition' existing violations of them." (Emphasis supplied.)
In his dissenting opinion in the same case, Mr. Justice Frankfurter referred to the Sherman and Clayton Acts in the disjunctive (at 392): "The Federal Trade Commission Act was
designed, doubtless, to enable the Commission to nip in the bud practices which, when
full blown, would violate the Sherman or Clayton A.ct." (Emphasis supplied.)
In a subsequent part of the text of my paper there is discussion of the extent to
which § 5 may be considered as a supplement to the Clayton Act.
H In United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 525 (1948), Justice Reed's
majority opinion noted that" ••• even though no unreasonable restraint may be achieved,
nevertheless a finding of specific intent to accomplish such an unreasonable restraint may
render the actor liable under the Sherman Act. Compare United States v. Griffith, 334
U.S. 100••••" This, of course, may raise baffling questions of the relation of §§ I and 2
of the Sherman Act.
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erly pointed out,15 the incipiency violation doctrine is compounded
if section 5 is used to stop in its incipiency a violation of incipient
Clayton Act offenses. The competitive effects clause of section 2 (a)
of the Robinson-Patman Act and of sections 3 and 7 of the Clayton
Act itself embodies an incipiency test of violation in the words
"where the effect may be."
Admittedly a broad grant of authority, section 5 is nevertheless
not a roving jurisdiction "unconfined and vagrant." Congress
appears to have "canalized" section 5 "within banks that keep it
from overflowing" into the area covered by the Clayton Act.16

III.

SECTION

5

CASES INVOLVING ONLY CONVENTIONAL
SHERMAN

AcT OFFENSES

The contours of the interrelation of section 5 and the Sherman
Act have been reasonably well defined. The Supreme Court has
correctly reiterated that the Commission has jurisdiction under
section 5 to attack incipient or consummated Sherman Act offenses.
It is therefore pointless to dispute the Commission's resort to section 5 with respect to the variety of conventional Sherman Act
offenses equally familiar in the exercise of the Department of Justice Sherman Act proceedings. The Commission is also empowered
to question as Sherman Act offenses conduct not yet adjudicated
under that act but this may raise borderland novel issues.17 In
this area, harmonization of the Commission's exercise of section 5
jurisdiction requires the Commission to be held to the same substantive criteria as those established by judicial interpretations of
the Sherman Act. This will require, for example, distinctions between unreasonable per se restraints and those demanding an extended Rule of Reason examination.18 Moreover, in the latter types
15 Howrey, supra note 2; Hodson, Exclusive Dealing, 1954 CCH ANTrmusr LAw
SYMPOSIUM 140 (N.Y. State Bar Ass'n); Butler, Federal Trade Commission Jurisdiction
Under the Incipiency Doctrine, UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN INSTITUTE ON FEDERAL ANTITRUsr
LAws 154 (1953).
16 The quoted words in this analogy come from the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice
Cardozo in Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935), where he compares the unlawful delegation of legislative power in the National Industrial Recovery
Act with the limitations in the power committed to the Federal Trade Commission in § 5.
17 A leading writer has said that "the Federal Trade Commission Act may be viewed
not merely as being as basic, but as being even more far-reaching than the Sherman Act."
He further emphasized that " ..• the general practitioner who advises a client on compliance with the antitrust laws would do well to bracket together the Sherman and Federal
Trade Commission Acts, and to view their collectively broad commands as a flaming sword
which turns every way to guard the competitive tree of life of our economy." VAN CISE,
UNDERSTANDING THE ANTrrn.usr LAws 17, 18 (1958 ed.).
18 See Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, 359 U.S. 207 (1959) and my comment&
thereon, 15 A.B.A. ANTITRUsr SECTION REP. 37-42 (1959).
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of cases, the Commission should sustain the burden of proving
substantially adverse effects upon competition in the relevant
product and geographic market. In all cases in this category, the
Commission's complaint should identify with reasonable definiteness the charges it has reason to believe constitute consummated
or incipient violations of the Sherman Act.
Motion Picture Advertising19 exemplifies resort to section 5 as
a Sherman Act supplement. At issue were contracts for exclusive
dealing in the display of advertising films. The majority of the
Court held that the Commission's findings of fact, supported by
substantial evidence, made it plain "that a device which has sewed
up a market so tightly for the benefit of a few falls within the
prohibitions of the Sherman Act and is therefore an 'unfair method
of competition' within the meaning of Section 5 (a) of the Federal
Trade Commission Act." It should be noted that Mr. Justice
Frankfurter's dissenting opinion, joined by Mr. Justice Burton,
does not question this scope of section 5. Rather, Mr. Justice
Frankfurter was concerned ·with the basis and scope of judicial
review of the Commission's orders as disclosed in the following:
"My primary concern is that the Commission has not related its analysis of this industry to the standards of illegality
in Section 5 with sufficient clarity to enable this Court to review the order."
"In any event," he said, "the Commission has not found any
Sherman Law violation."
IV.

COMMISSION CASES INITIATED IN COMPLAINTS
SOLELY UNDER CLAYTON AcT

This category, of course, does not raise issues under section 5.
Here we deal with Commission proceedings where it claims jurisdiction solely under specified provisions of the Clayton Act. This
area, however, requires evaluation to ascertain the extent to which
the Commission's approach and Clayton Act interpretations of the
courts reveal either harmonization within the congressional design
or dissonances curable only by congressional action. My evaluation
is here made only in summary form.
lOFTC v. Motion Picture Advertising Service Co., 344 U.S .. 392 (1944). The Commission did not resort to § 3 of the Clayton Act since it believed that the contracts did not
come within the transactions specified in that section. See infra, "Section 5 in Relation to
Jurisdictional Deficiencies in Section 3 of the Clayton Act."
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A. Robinson-Patman Act20
Section 2 of the Clayton Act, the Robinson-Patman Act, presents some of the most troublesome deviations from a consistent
over-all antitrust policy. Simplicity Pattern's21 decision and unequivocal dicta make plain that sections 2 (c),22 (d) and (e) cannot
be construed in harmony with the burden of proof requirement of
substantial injury to competition under section 2 (a). Only Congress can convert these illegal per se violations into a Rule of
Reason approach. 23 If this is not done, the resulting disharmony
will remain contrary to national antitrust policy. It is contended
that the illegal per se approach protects against coercion by
powerful buyers of special or secret rebates. It nevertheless cannot
be denied that illegal per se violations forestall inquiry into the
market effects of the discriminatory practices. To that extent, they
are out of tune with antitrust standards.24
Interpretations of 2 (a) tend in part toward reconciliation ·with
antitrust and in part away from it. The Commission has only partially fulfilled its words of promise to require proof of the "substantiality of effects reasonably probable" in section 2 (a) injury
to competition proceedings.25 Commission decisions, especially
those involving buyers' line competition, have reflected only part
of the Rule of Reason method of inquiry into competitive effects.
In the automotive parts buyers' line cases,26 the courts of appeals
20 For fuller discussion, see my analysis in 15 A.B.A. ANTITR.usr SEcnoN REP. 56•69
(1959).
21 FTC v. Simplicity Pattern Co., 360 U.S. 55 (1959).
22 Cf. the majority and dissenting opinions in the five-to-four Supreme Court decision
in FTC v. Henry Broch & Co., 363 U.S. 166 (1960).
23 Apparently Mr. Justice Frankfurter joined in the unanimous decision of the Supreme
Court in FTC v. Simplicity Pattern Co., 360 U.S. 55 (1959), because he was persuaded
that Congress left no alternative to the per se illegality approach to § 2 (c), (d) and (e) of
the Robinson-Patman Act. But compare Mr. Justice Frankfurter's concurrence in the
dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Whittaker in FTC v. Henry Broch &: Co., supra note 22.
24 See perceptive analysis of Corwin Edwards, former Chief Economist of the Federal
Trade Commission in THE PRICE DISCRIMINATION LAw (1959), where he proposes revisions
in the Robinson-Patman Act which "would bear little resemblance" to the existing statute.
25 General Foods Corp., CCH TRADE RF.G. REP. ,r 25,172 (F.T.C. Dkt. 5675) (1954).
26 This line of decisions is cited in footnote 79 of my paper in 15 A.B.A. REP. 58
(1959). But compare the majority opinion of Chairman Kintner in Fred Bronner Corp.,
F.T.C. Dkt. 7068 (1960), stating that in the automotive parts cases, relied on by the
Commission counsel in support of the complaint, "there were additional factors pertinent
to the price discriminations there involved which are not shown to exist in this case."
The majority held that, "Under the circumstances, it is our opinion that the evidence of
record fails to establish that the effect of the price difference here involved may be substantially to lessen competition between competing purchasers." Commissioners Secrest
and Anderson agreed with the result and filed concurring opinions. Commissioner Kem
dissented, stating that the majority holding "constitutes a retreat from the position taken
by the Commission and sustained by the courts in the automotive parts cases, an act of
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have generally sustained the Commission's findings of fact based
on this partial Rule of Reason approach. The Seventh Circuit's
insistence in Minneapolis-Honeywell,21 that in both sellers' and
buyers' line cases, the Commission must prove injury to competition by showing substantial interference with competition has not
been completely observed by the Commission and the courts of
appeals in buyers' line 2 (a) cases. In Yale and Towne,28 however,
the Commission's opinion is a shining example of a genuine Rule
of Reason analysis of competitive effects in the relevant market on
the sellers' line. The Commission nevertheless has more frequently
stressed injury to individual competitors, or a group of competitors, in the buyers' line proceedings.
In my opinion, these discrepancies are inconsistent with antitrust concepts, and are not dictated by the Morton Salt29 rationale
of the Supreme Court. They can still be corrected in 2 (a) cases
by the Commission itself without congressional amendment, and
thus bring 2 (a) into proper relation to over-all antitrust policy.
The Supreme Court's recent unanimous Anheuser-Busch30 opinion
repeatedly cautioned that the Court was merely deciding that price
discrimination in 2 (a) is equated with price differentiations having
the proscribed anticompetitive effects and not within the 2 (a) and
2 (b) absolute defenses. Anheuser-Busch, therefore, in no way forecloses inquiry into competitive effects on the sellers' line or buyers'
line by use of a full-scale Rule of Reason probe.
In the words of the Attorney General's Antitrust Committee
Report, the Commission's analysis of statutory injury should "center on the vigor of competition in the market rather than hardship
to individual businessmen."31

B. Section 3 of the Clayton Act
Section 3 of the Clayton Act is applicable to exclusive arrangements and tying clauses. When this article was completed, Tampa
Electric Company 82 was pending in the Supreme Court. At that
retrogression which will adversely affect enforcement of the Robinson-Patman Act in a
most critical and important area."
27 Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co. v. ITC, 191 F.2d 786 (7th Cir. 1951).
28 Yale &: Towne Mfg. Co., F.T.C. Dkt. 6232 (1956).
29ITC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37 (1948).
80ITC v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 363 U.S. 536 (1960).
81 REPORT OF THE ATIORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL CoMMrrrEE To STUDY THE ANTI·
TRUST LAws 164 (1955).
82Tampa Electric Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 276 F.2d 766 (6th Cir. 1960), reu'd and
remanded, 365 U.S. 320 (1961).
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time this writer stated that Standard Stations3 3 and subsequent
court decisions 34 relied primarily upon quantitative measures in
determining the anticompetitive impact of exclusive dealing and
requirement contracts. We further stated that so long as that trend
continued, it must be considered as falling short of accommodation to over-all antitrust policy. It was also asserted that nothing
Congress has written precludes a full Rule of Reason examination
in section 3 cases based upon a qualitative substantiality test of
violation.35
This position is confirmed by the Tamp a Electric seven-to-two
decision (Justices Black and Douglas dissenting without opinion)
of the Supreme Court.36 Tampa's rationale illuminates the practical application of the statutory standards and tests of violation
of section 3.
"Following the guidelines of earlier decisions," said Mr. Justice
Clark, "certain considerations must be taken." What are these
considerations in any given case? On its facts Tampa involved a
requirements contract for purchase from Nashville, a Kentucky
coal company, of all the coal Tampa, a public utility, would require over a twenty-year period as boiler fuel for a generating
station Tampa was constructing in Tampa, Florida. Tampa was
given an option of buying coal from suppliers other than Nashville
if it converted other equipment using oil to coal. Tampa was also
free to purchase up to fifteen percent of its fuel requirements from
a by-product of a local supplier. After vast expenditures by Tampa
to install coal burning equipment at the new station, Nashville
informed Tampa that the contract was illegal under the antitrust
laws and would not be performed. Tampa brought suit for a
declaration that the contract was valid and enforceable.
The Supreme Court assumed the contract is an exclusive dealing arrangement and that the relevant line of commerce is bituminous coal alone. Decisive in reversal of the judgment below was
the failure of the lower courts to give "the required effect to a
controlling factor in the case - the relevant competitive market
33 Standard
34 Richfield

Oil Co. of California v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949).
Oil Corp. v. United States, 343 U.S. 922 (1952); United States v. Sun Oil
Co., 176 F. Supp. 715 (E.D. Pa. 1959); Dictograph and Anchor Serum cases, infra notes
41 and 42; and Tampa Electric Co., supra note 32.
35 My version of the quantitative versus the qualitative substantiality test of violation
is set forth in 15 A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION REP. 70-71 (1959).
36 Tampa Electric Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320 (1961). The original contract
was signed with another company but that interest was assigned to Nashville and later
to West Kentucky Coal Company.
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area." The Court reversed judgment for Nashville and remanded
the case to the district court.
Reviewing its prior section 3 decisions, the Court specifies the
considerations which must be taken to determine whether it is
"probable that the performance of the contract will foreclose
competition in a substantial share of the line of commerce affected." First, the relevant product line of commerce must be carved
out "on the basis of the facts peculiar to the case." Second, the
area of effective competition must be charted, i.e., the geographic
market area in which the seller operates and to which the buyer
"can practicably turn for supplies." Third, "the competition foreclosed by the contract must be found to constitute a substantial
share of the relevant market." In weighing the various factors,
"particularized considerations of the parties' operations are not
irrelevant."
In this ,;vriter's view Tampa Electric calms-indeed, should
remove - the alarm that the Court's previous exclusive dealing
decisions under section 3, particularly Standard Stations, in effect
erected a mechanical illegal per se market foreclosure rule. It is
gratifying - though doubtless surprising to those who interpreted
Standard Stations to the contrary - that the Court now lays a
foundation for an extended Rule of Reason examination of the
competitive effects of exclusive dealing under section 3 in any
given case.37 If Standard Stations seemed to give too much weight
to quantitative measures of adverse effects upon competition, the
Court now expressly states that "a mere showing that the contract
itself involves a substantial number of dollars is ordinarily of little
consequence" and "the dollar-volume by itself, is not the test."
The twenty-year period of the contract was "singled out as the
principal vice," but in the case of a public utility assurance of a
steady and ample supply of fuel is in the public interest.
37 Even more surprising is the Court's citation of United States v. Columbia Steel Co.,
ll34 U.S. 495 (1948), which arose under the Sherman Act but, unlike the incipiency test
of violation under § 3, requires proof of a consummated unreasonable restraint of trade.
Mr. Justice Clark's listing of the factors which must be weighed under § 3 to determine
substantiality of foreclosure of competitor is strikingly like those mentioned in United
States v. Columbia Steel Co., ll34 U.S. 495, 527 (1948). In Tampa, Mr. Justice Clark said
(at 329): "To determine substantiality in a given case, it is necessary to weigh the
probable effect of the contract on the relevant area of effective competition, taking into
account the relative strength of the parties, the proportionate volume of commerce involved
in relation to the total volume of commerce in the relevant market area, and the probable
immediate and future effects which pre-emption of that share of the market might have
on effective competition therein. It follows that a mere showing that the contract itself
involves a substantial number of dollars is ordinarily of little consequence."
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Mr. Justice Clark's opinion in Tampa, however, warns against
assuming that prior section 3 cases before that Court should or
would have been decided differently. The Justice distinguishes the
dominant market position of the seller in Standard Fashions,38 the
myriad substantial sales volume outlets and industry-wide use of
exclusive contracts in Standard Stations, and restrictive tying arrangements as in International Salt.39
The crucial issue of the relevant geographic market was a
question of fact the district court should not have resolved by
judicial notice on a motion for summary judgment without presentation of evidence. The Supreme Court observed that both courts
below seemed to have been satisfied with inquiry into competition
only within "Peninsular Florida." The Court concluded that
neither that latter area nor the entire state of Florida nor Florida
and Georgia combined constituted "the relevant market of effective competition." Rather the appropriate area is bounded by that
in which the respondents and 700 other companies in the producing
area effectively compete in marketing their coal of which the overwhelming tonnage is sold outside Florida and Georgia. Taking
note of statistical data on this phase, the Court concluded:
"From these statistics it clearly appears that the proportionate volume of the total relevant coal product as to which
the challenged contract pre-empted competition, less than 1%
is, conservatively speaking, an insubstantial amount. A more
accurate figure, even assuming pre-emption to the extent of
the maximum anticipated total requirements, 2,250,000 tons
a year, would be .77%."
This minimal pre-emption, the Court concluded, would not
tend substantially to foreclose competition in the relevant coal
market.
Tampa Electric also requires the Federal Trade Commission
to revise its approach to section 3 cases on exclusive dealing. Before the Court's decision in Tampa Electric, we noted that in
Maico 40 the Commission professed that, as an administrative triss Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrane-Houston Co., 258 U.S. 346 (1922).
39lnternational Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
40 Maico, Inc., 50 F.T.C. 485 (1953). See also and compare Harley-Davidson Motor
Co., 50 F.T.C. 1047 (1954); Revlon Products Corp., 51 F.T.C. 260 (1954); Outboard Marine
& Mfg. Co., 52 F.T.C. 1553 (1956). ·while he was General Counsel of the Commission, the
former Chairman Kintner wrote an article espousing the extended Rule of Reason in•
quiry under § 3. Kintner, Exclusive Dealing, 3 PRACTICAL LAWYER 69 (1957). He stated
his belief that this method was used in the above-cited cases. The court decisions in
Dictograph and Anchor Serum, he asserted, did not foreclose the Commission's discretion
as an administrative tribunal to make an extended market inquiry beyond that in Stand-
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bunal intended by Congress as one equipped to explore all relevant market facts, it is not necessarily bound by the Standard
Stations strictures. The Commission might have continued to
regard itself as having the discretion to undertake a broader market
inquiry were it not for the Second Circuit and Eighth Circuit
decisions affirming Commission orders in Dictograph41 and Anchor
Serum42 on the basis of Standard Stations.
Tampa Electric should create, or restore, as the case may be,
the Commission's belief that it is not cabined by restrictive quantitative measures of adverse competitive effects in weighing the
factors pertinent to substantiality of foreclosure of competition in
section 3 exclusive arrangement cases.
Hereafter the Commission would be wise in giving heed to
guidelines and considerations specified in Tampa Electric as an
extended Rule of Reason method of adjudicating section 3 exclusive dealing issues. For the Supreme Court majority has at long
last made pronouncements apparently intended to bring the incipiency test of violation of section 3 into harmony with over-all
antitrust policy.
In tying clause cases, the Commission is confronted with Supreme
Court constructions which still leave uncertain where to draw the
ard Stations applicable to Department of Justice cases. See also footnote 13 of Mr. Justice
Frankfurter's opinion for the majority in Standard Stations, supra note 33.
The recent decision of the Commission in Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., F.T.C. Dkt.
6962 (1960), involving a count charging violation of § 3 of the Clayton Act and two
counts charging violation of § 5, adopted the Initial Decision of the Hearing Examiner
which included a holding that § 3 was violated. Commissioner Kern's opinion declared
that since the date of the Commisson's action in Maico, the court of appeals decisions in
Dictograph and Anchor Serum, infra notes 41 and 42, and in the private suit in Tampa
Electric, supra note 36, Standard Stations is to be applied by the Commission in § 3 cases.
It may be that Commissioner Tait's concurrence only in the result indicates he was
unwilling to join the Commission majority in overruling in practical effect the Commission's approach in Maico. On the particular record in Mytinger &- Casselberry, it is possible to infer that the same holding of illegality might have been reached via either the
Standard Stations or Maico approach. In any event, Mytinger o- Casselberry placed the
Commission on record as bowing to the commands of Standard Stations. To the same
effect, see Timken Roller Bearing Co., F.T.C. Dkt. 6504 (1961), where respondent was
held in violation of § 3 in a complaint charging violation only of that section.
The Supreme Court's rationale in Tampa Electric, as analyzed in the text of this
article, calls upon the Commission to re-assess its approach to § 3 cases. The REPORT OF
THE ATIORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL Col\lMITI"EE To STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAWS 148 (1955),
takes a sound position that identical criteria should govern a § 3 case irrespective of
whether it initially is tried before a court or the Commission. The Report states (n. 77):
"Chaotic consequences might attend the anomaly of subjecting identical trade practices to
different legal principles due to fortuitous circumstances determining whether a District
Court or the Commission sits as the initial arbiter, in either event subject to appellate
judicial review."
<11 Dictograph Products,
42 Anchor Serum Co. v.

Inc. v. FTC, 217 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1954).
FTC, 217 F.2d 867 (7th Cir. 1954).
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line between the test of violation applicable to a section 3 Clayton
Act proceeding and the test applicable to a Sherman Act proceeding.43 The Supreme Court has approved the apparently lesser
burden under section 3 of proving that a substantial volume of
interstate commerce in the tied product may be restrained and to
this the quantitative substantiality test of violation has been applied.44 In Northern Pacific4 5 under section l of the Sherman Act,
the Supreme Court majority has reduced to virtual per se illegality
any tying clause where there is proof of sufficient economic power
over the tying leverage to impose an appreciable restraint over "not
insubstantial" interstate commerce in the tied article or service.40
In a proceeding under section 3 of the Clayton Act the Commission would appear to be justified in heeding the Supreme
Court's warning that, unlike requirements contracts or other exclusive dealing arrangements, "tying agreements serve hardly any
purpose beyond suppression of competition" and "fare harshly"
under the antitrust laws. This axiom, expressed in Supreme Court
opinions, in effect tends to create a presumption of antitrust illegality, subject to the legally permissible exception of good will protection by prescribing reasonable specifications for the tied product
or service.47
C. Section 7 of the Clayton Act
Last year this writer evaluated the Commission's rulings and
some of the Initial Decisions of Hearing Examiners in cases arising
solely under amended section 7 of the Clayton Act.48 The conclu43 Compare the Commission's § 3 tying clause cases in Insto Gas Corp., 51 F.T.C. 363
(1954) and Signode Steel Strapping Co. v. FTC, 132 F.2d 48 (4th Cir. 1942); Judson L.
Thomson Mfg. Co. v. FTC, 150 F.2d 952 (1st Cir. 1945).
If a § 5 proceeding should be brought by the Commission in a tying clause case where
there is lack of jurisdiction under § 3 of the Clayton Act, such as one involving services
not within the commodities clause of § 3, novel questions would arise. Would the Commission attack the tying clause as an incipient or consummated Sherman Act violation
governed by the Northern Pacific Sherman Act test, or would the Commission apply the
Clayton Act test under § 3? Compare approach taken by the Commission in a Robinson-Patman Act type of situation in Grand Union Co., F.T.C. Dkt. 6973 (1960), discussed
at length infra.
44 See especially International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947) and Times•
Picayune Pub. Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953).
45 Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958). See distinctions made
in dicta in United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa. 1960).
46 For fuller discussion, see my paper in 15 A.B.A . .ANrrrRuST SECTION REP. 39-41 (1959).
47 See limitations indicated in International Business Machines v. United States, 298
U.S. 131 (1936); International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947); Standard Oil
of California v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949).
48 See 15 A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION REP. 69·72 (1959). This, of course, does not imply
approval of seepage into amended § 7 of the mechanical quantitative test in the manner
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sion then stated still stands, namely, that the Commission is applying a full-scale Rule of Reason method of adjudicating amended
section 7 merger issues. In general, the Commission is applying a
qualitative rather than mere quantitative substantiality test of violation, namely, an examination of all relevant market facts and
factors in determining whether or not there is a reasonable probability of a substantial lessening of competition or tendency to create
a monopoly in line of commerce in the relevant product and geographic market.
This is a proper method of accommodating amended section 7
of the Clayton Act to the national antitrust policy expressed by
Congress in that act and as a supplement to the Sherman Act.
V. SECTION 5 CASES INVOLVING JURISDICTIONAL DEFICIENCIES
UNDER THE CLAYTON AcT AND COMBINED SECTION 5 AND
CLAYTON AcT CHARGES
A. Preliminary Observations
This is the category which brings into sharp focus "the legal
puzzles" presented by the interrelations of section 5 and the Clayton Act.
In this borderland, jurisdictional deficiencies under the Clayton
Act may be found in the Robinson-Patman Act, or in section 3 or
section 7. In Commission complaints combining section 5 and
Clayton Act charges, the issues may become more complicated
because they may concern not only jurisdictional deficiencies but
also failure to segregate section 5 charges from those under the
Sherman and Clayton Acts, and claims of jurisdiction under section
5 over practices within Clayton Act coverage.
We do not underrate the tortuous path the Commission and
the courts must travel in any attempt to bring the Sherman, Federal Trade Commission and Clayton Acts into a concordant whole
compatible with congressional intention. Before analyzing particular cases, we first suggest some general principles for a synthesis
of the statutory pattern in this category of cases.
While alternative constructions may be gleaned from congressional legislative history, it seems that, on balance, the Commission
has authority under section 5 to proceed against equivalent types
of practices not within the jurisdictional bounds of the coverage
specified in the Clayton Act.
it was applied under old § 7 in the majority opinion of the Supreme Court in United
States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours&: Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957).
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This was the position taken by the Attorney General's Antitrust
Committee.49 Its Report recognized that the Commission is legitimately entitled to challenge under section 5 conduct economically
equivalent to the anticompetitive practices in Clayton Act provisions but not reachable thereunder due to lack of technical prerequisites. In accord is the Commission's pronouncement in its
interlocutory ruling in Foremost Dairies that ". . . practices not
technically within the scope of a specific section of the Clayton Act
may nevertheless constitute a violation of Section 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act." 50
In this connection, certain qualifications must be kept in mind.
Section 5 should impose upon the Commission the same burden of
proof as the particular Clayton Act provision covering the "economically equivalent" anticompetitive transaction or practice.
Furthermore, as the Attorney General's Antitrust Committee
Report adds, section 5 should not be invoked as a substitute for
attacking a transaction or practice which is covered by the Clayton
Act.
Still another caveat should be noted. In Foremost Dairies,
supra, the Commission's interlocutory ruling further stated that
"facts indicating a violation of section 7 of the Clayton Act, as
amended, may also indicate a violation of section 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act."
This does not warrant the Commission's use of pleadings in its
complaints which, by use of a single section 5 count,51 or plural
49 REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMrrrEE To STUDY THE ANTITRUST
LAws 148-149 (1959).
50 Foremost Dairies, Inc., 52 F.T .C. 1480 (1956).
51 At the time this article was first published, we stated that the single blunderbuss
§ 5 count in the sales commission TBA complaints reveals great lack of clarity in these
respects. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. & Texas Co., F.T.C. Dkt. 6485 (1956); Goodyear
Tire & Rubber Co. & Atlantic Refining Co., F.T.C. Dkt. 6486 (1956); Firestone Tire &:
Rubber Co.&: Shell Oil Co., F.T.C. Dkt. 6487 (1956). On March 9, 1961, the Commission
(four members participating and the opinion of the Commission written by Chairman
Kintner) found that § 5 was violated and entered cease-and-desist orders in the GoodyearAtlantic and Firestone-Shell cases. The Goodrich-Texas proceeding, however, was remanded to the Hearing Examiner for reception of further evidence concerning the competitive effects of the respondents' practices.
All three cases involve the legality of contracts between the respective tire and oil
companies calling for payment of a sales commission to the oil company in return for
assistance in promoting sales of the tire company's automotive tires, batteries and accessories (known as TBA products) to the retail and wholesale outlets of the oil company.
We do not purport here to go into the merits of these cases. Viewing them simply
from the standpoint of the jurisdictional scope of § 5 in relation to the Sherman and
Clayton Acts, we still believe that at their inception the Commission's complaints failed
to identify with reasonable definiteness the charges therein. At that time, the respondents
were entitled to know whether the "unfair methods of competition" or "the unfair acts
and practices" within the reach of § 5 comprehended only charges of Sherman Act types
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counts combining in one complaint section 5 and other sections
of the Clayton Act, do not identify with reasonable definiteness
charges related to the particular statutory provision. Otherwise
the Commission would be claiming jurisdiction over composite or
hybrid offenses in pleadings that would not enable a respondent
to contest the issue whether the Commission is staying within the
metes and bounds of each statute and its supplementation as allowed by congressional intent.
Most important of all, this attempted accommodation of the
several statutes in this antitrust pattern should not be viewed as an
invitation to invoke section 5 whenever the Commission believes
that the conduct "runs counter" to or is contrary to "the spirit" of
any one of these statutes.152 Such vague grasping for jurisdiction
would be a misconceived and uncontrolled administrative discretion
of the Commission neither intended by Congress nor supportable
of violation, or whether the charges were also aimed at conduct within §§ 2 and 3 of
the Clayton Act, or economically equivalent thereto but technically lacking in jurisdictional requisites for Clayton Act coverage.
A fair reading of the complaints as of the time of their issuance reveal that they
allowed for a hybrid of Sherman, Robinson-Patman and Clayton Act § 3 charges in a
breadth of allegations and generality of language that left at large the possible defenses
respondents might have to meet. Such clarification regarding the theory and scope of
the complaints as may have resulted from the hearings, or at the time of the Initial
Decision of the Hearing Examiner, or now in the Commission's findings, conclusions and
opinion, is beside the point. As a matter of fairness, the complaint itself should perform
the minimal function of informing a respondent with reasonable specificity of the charges
and their relation to § 5 as distinct from the Clayton Act. Otherwise respondent's counsel,
as of the time of the complaint, is not in a position to know whether the Commission is
seeking to substitute § 5 in challenging conduct covered by the Clayton Act or is claiming
jurisdiction under § 5 over conduct not technically covered under the Clayton Act but
equivalent in economic nature and effect.
This latter hazard is now illustrated by the inclusion in the Commission's orders in
the Goodyear-Atlantic and Firestone-Shell cases of paragraphs which on their face are
in significant part in the tenor of the Commission's orders in brokerage cases under § 2 (c)
of the Robinson-Patman Act. The complaints in these TBA cases did not give reasonable
notice of this phase nor did the Commission's opinion discuss violation from this standpoint. It was merely mentioned in passing in the appeal brief at p. 97 of counsel supporting the complaint. Admittedly, the Commission's order, as indicated in note 100
infra, may include any injunctive provision reasonably related to prevention or correction
of the violation found to exist. This does not, however, absolve the Commission from a
failure to make an order responsive to what the complaint and the record evidence as a
whole warrant, both in giving respondents notice of what they must be prepared to
meet, and in not leaving a reviewing court in the dark as to relation of the remedy to the
substantive violation. Othenvise an excessively broad order may ban lawful conduct
which is separable from that found to be unlawful.
Also beside the point, so far as the notice-giving function of the initial complaint
pleadings is concerned, would be the hindsight view that respondents are now apprised
by the detailed analysis in the Commission's opinion that the contracts are illegal under
§ 5 as basically a Sherman Act type of violation stemming from substantial anticompetitive
effects at the manufacturing, wholesale and retail levels.
152 See

extended discussion infra of Grand Union Co., F.T.C. Dkt. 6973 (1960).
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on judicial review.53 Motion Picture Advertising,54 it should be remembered, sustained the Commission's section 5 order in a case
involving the equivalent of an exclusive dealing practice covered
by section 3 of the Clayton Act. The Shell Oil, Socony Mobil and
Ice Cream cases,55 discussed later in this paper, were also brought
under section 5 on charges of equivalence to exclusive dealing
within section 3. Grand Union, also discussed below, was a section
5 case attacking a discriminatory practice equivalent to that covered in 2 (d) of the Robinson-Patman Act. These are far removed
from nebulous charges of practices "contrary to the antitrust laws"
or in violation of "the spirit" of the Clayton Act.
In the discharge of their task of judicial review of the Commission's orders, the courts are the ultimate safeguards in assessing
the record in any given case to determine whether there is substantial evidence to support the Commission's findings of fact and in
deciding what, as a matter of law, is encompassed within section 5
or the Sherman and Clayton Acts.56 Mr. Justice Frankfurter's dissenting opinion in Motion Picture Advertising is a constructive
essay on these aspects of administrative law applicable to the Commission.57 It provides a guiding frame of reference for many of the
issues here discussed.
53 Note the interesting analogies found in the opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Hughes and
in the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Cardozo in Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United
States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935), discussing the differences between the unconstitutional delegation
of legislative power under the Codes of Fair Competition plan of the National Industrial
Recovery Act and the limitations on the powers of the Federal Trade Commission under
§ 5. The opinions emphasize the difference between prohibiting unfair methods of com•
petition and the affirmative power to regulate fair and lawful methods of competition.
MFTC v. Motion Picture Advertising Service Co., 344 U.S. 392 (1944).
55 Shell Oil Co., F.T.C. Dkt. 7044 (1959); Socony Mobil Oil Co., F.T.C. Dkt. 6915
(1960); Carnation Co., F.T.C. Dkts. 6172-6179 and 6425 (1959); and see infra for further
references to these proceedings.
156 As flexible and expansible as § 5 may be within the interpretations of the Supreme
Court, the landmark opinion of then Mr. Justice Stone in FTC v. R. F. Keppel & Bros., 291
U.S. 304 (1934), warned it was not intimated that "the Commission may prohibit every
unethical competitive practice regardless of its character or consequence." In Motion
Picture Advertising the Court differed on the assessment of the record but FTC v. Gratz,
253 U.S. 421 (1920), still stands for the proposition that it is for the courts, and not the
Commission, ultimately to determine, as a matter of law, what § 5 includes.
In the following illustrative cases the Commission has also issued complaints under
§ 5 alleging knowing inducement or receipt of payments or allowances similar to the
allegations in Grand Union: Foster Publishing Co., F.T.C. Dkt. 7698 (1959); J. Wein•
garten, Inc., F.T.C. Dkt. 7714 (1960); American Radiator and Standard Sanitary Corp.,
F.T.C. Dkt. 7835 (1960); Benner Tea Co., F.T.C. Dkt. 7866 (1960); Individualized
Catalogues, Inc., F.T.C. Dkt. 7971 (1960); ADT Catalogs, F.T.C. Dkt. 8100 (1960). Cf.
R.H. Macy&: Co., F.T.C. Dkt. 7869 (1960), containing novel allegations under § 5 of use
of the leverage of purchasing power to induce contributions from suppliers in connection
with the centennial celebration of Macy in New York.
57 Among his points are these: determination of the scope of § 5 is a matter of law
to be defined by the courts; this "was not entrusted to the Commission for ad hoc
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Even when the Commission stays within the bounds of its
authority, decisions in conflict with over-all antitrust policy may be
attributable in some instances to the Congress, as we have previously shown in the effect of the Supreme Court's interpretations of
congressional intention in Simplicity Pattern58 with respect to 2 (c),
(d) and (e) of the Robinson-Patman Act, and in the subsequent
Broch59 interpretation of 2 (c) by the majority of the Court. If
Congress is dissatisfied with the Court's reading of its intention, the
responsibility for correction of resulting deviations from desired
national antitrust policy rests with that legislative body.
We now turn to an analysis of the recent utilization of section
5 by the Commission in this category of cases, considering the jurisdictional deficiencies in the Robinson-Patman Act and sections 3
and 7 of the Clayton Act in the order named.
B. Jurisdictional Deficiencies for Robinson-Patman Act
Proceeding

The recent four-to-one decision of the Commission in Grand
Union° 0 squarely joins the issue whether the Commission can resort to section 5 where a discriminatory practice does not come
within the Robinson-Patman Act because of a technical jurisdictional omission in that statute.
The complaint alleged and the Hearing Examiner found
knowing inducement or receipt by respondent of promotional allowances not made available by the respondent's suppliers on proportionally equal terms to the respondent's competitors.
This, in effect, amounts to knowing inducement of a violation
of section 2 (d) of the Robinson-Patman Act. The complaint appears to be drawn on the theory that buyer liability under section
2 (£) of the Robinson-Patman Act applies only to a direct or indirect price discrimination under section 2 (a), and therefore does
not embrace a 2 (d) promotional allowance or a 2 (e) services or
determination within the interstices of individualized records but was left for ascertainment by this Court"; otherwise "the curb on the Comim$ion's power . • • would be
relaxed, and unbridled intervention into business practices encouraged"; " • • • he is no
friend of administrative law who thinks that the Commission should be left at large."
r,s FTC v. Simplicity Pattern Co., 360 U.S. 55 (1959).
166 (1960).
(1960). Accord: American News Co., F.T.C.
Dkt. 7396 (1961). In a similar case pending on appeal before the Commission, the Initial
Decision of the Hearing Examiner held there was a violation of § 5. Giant Food Shopping
Center, Inc., F.T.C, Dkt. 6459 (1960). See also consent settlement order in a much
earlier § 5 case in United Cigar-Whelan Stores Corp., F.T.C. Dkt. 6525 (1956).
1511 FTC v. Henry Broch 8: Co., 363 U.S.
60 Grand Union Co., F.T.C. Dkt. 6973
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facilities violation. Section 5 was therefore used to bridge a gap
in jurisdiction the Commission believed to exist even though the
Commission's statutory interpretation of 2 (f) as not covering 2 (d)
or 2 (e) was left open in Automatic Canteen. 61
The majority opinion of Commissioner Secrest might have
been narrowed to precisely what was the issue on the particular
record of the case if it had been confined to the following ground:
"In the absence of evidence of Congressional intent not to
render unlawful practices related to those specifically prohibited by the Robinson-Patman Act, there is no substance to
respondent's argument that the Federal Trade Commission
Act cannot be extended to proscribe discriminatory practices
which do not come within the purview of the Robinson-Patman Act. The rule of statutory construction is that general
and specific statutes should be read together and harmonized,
if possible, and that the specific statute will prevail over the
general only to the extent that there is conflict between them.
There is no dispute as to whether the specific provisions of the
Robinson-Patman Act are controlling insofar as they specifically prohibit certain practices. There is nothing in the Act
itself, however, which conflicts with the Commission's broad
authority under Section 5 to define and proceed against practices which it deems to be unfair, including those which may
come within the periphery of the later Act, although not
within its letter."
The majority, however, was not content with this statutory
interpretation which, in my opinion, would in itself have been a
rational reading of congressional intention for harmonizing section
5 and the jurisdictional defect in 2 (f) as applied to 2 (d). Instead
the majority used the occasion for arriving at a sustainable result
on the facts of the case by announcing a rationale with a much
deeper potential thrust.
61 In footnote 14 of the majority opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Automatic Canteen Co. of America v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61 (1952), the Court said regarding its interpretation
of the ambiguous language of § 2 (f): "We of course do not, in so reading 2 (f), purport
to pass on the question whether a 'discrimination in price' includes the prohibitions in
such other sections of the Act as §§ 2 (d) and 2 (e)."
It might be argued that in cases like Grand Union the Commission should have tested
this issue by an administrative interpretation that § 2 (f) includes 2 (d) and 2 (e). We
believe that where alternative constructions are fairly open (cf. Automatic Canteen, supra),
the Commission has discretion to interpret 2 (f) as limited to price discrimination under
2 (a). In any event, the proper interpretation of congressional intention is ultimately for
the Supreme Court to decide and Grand Union itself would offer an occasion for such a
test case.
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The majority opinion reviews the legislative history of the
Robinson-Patman Act to demonstrate that one primary evil Congress sought to curb was the use of mass purchasing power of large
buyers to induce discriminatory promotional concessions from suppliers. Commissioner Secrest then concluded:
"We think that the most that can be said on this point from
the legislative history and from a reading of the Act itself is
that the practice charged in the complaint is not specifically
prohibited by the Act. Certainly it cannot be inferred from
this fact that Congress countenanced a practice which so
clearly violates the spirit of the statute.
" ... it is our opinion that it is the duty of the Commission
to 'supplement and bolster' Section 2 of the amended Clayton
Act by prohibiting under Section 5 practices which violate
the spirit of the amended Act." (Emphasis supplied.)
The words "the spirit of the statute" in part caused dissenting
Commissioner Tait to say that he was "fearful of the implications
of what it [the majority opinion] says." This is understandable
and a timely warning that may prove to be prophetic if, in future
section 5 cases, the Commission majority chases spirits instead of
dealing with substance in supplementing the Robinson-Patman
Act where the alleged omissions are not so clearly the flesh and
blood of a Robinson-Patman type of violation as in Grand Union. 62
The issue in Grand Union on its particular record could have
been resolved without ambiguous and disturbing language in the
majority opinion if it had been limited to the ground that congressional omission of 2 (d) coverage in 2 (f) was inadvertent rather
62 Commissioner Tait, however, fears that "thousands of businessmen must first determine if the business practice is legal under the Robinson-Patman Act. Then they must
also determine whether the practice is legal under a vague standard, herein stated to be
'the spirit of the amended Act.' I am in vigorous disagreement with an approach to the
law which has too much sail and too little anchor, or too much supplement and too little
bolster.''
This fear would be justified if, unlike the particular facts of Grand Union, the practice is not the equivalent of the type prohibited by the Clayton Act. As stated infra in
the principles suggested for this category of cases, absent this economically equivalent
practice, businessmen would not be able to equate the business practice with the RobinsonPatman Act type of prohibition. If the Commission, in future cases under § 5, should
fail to observe the limitations on § 5 jurisdiction, the reasonable definiteness in the
complaint pleadings, and the proof requirements, all applicable to a § 5 proceeding based
on a jurisdictional defect in omission of a prohibition equivalent to those in the Clayton
Act, Commissioner Tait's apprehension will prove to be well founded. Certainly Congress
did not intend, as Commissioner Tait contends, that "Any alleged gaps which may appear
in the Clayton Act provisions . . • will not require legislation; the Commission merely
has to declare them contrary to the spirit of the Clayton Act.''
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than deliberate, in other words, a casus omissus.68 This was articulated in the opinion of Hearing Examiner Lewis accompanying his
Initial Decision which the majority adopted. The majority noted
this as a plausible argument advanced by counsel in support of the
complaint, citing the late Charles Wesley Dunn, who took part in
drafting the section.64
In that context Grand Union does not stray from the orbit of
the guides suggested below in this paper for reconciling section 5
and jurisdictional defects in the Robinson-Patman Act. It is arguable, of course, that what Congress has omitted even by inadvertence in one statute cannot be supplied in another statute, even
when they are construed together as covering the same kind of
subject matter. On this point, the Grand Union majority view of
the Commission is preferable. No conflict between section 5 and
2 (d) of the Robinson-Patman Act results from the majority decision. Business counsel should have no difficulty equating the
Grand Union practice with that covered in 2 (d).
With respect to the burden of proof of knowing inducement
and receipt of discriminatory promotional allowances, the majority
opinion in Grand Union holds that the Hearing Examiner's findings were supported by substantial evidence. Automatic Canteen's
"rule of convenience" for apportioning the burden or producing
evidence on this issue of the buyer's knowledge was applied.611
Similarly, on other aspects, the Grand Union majority opinion is
68 On the principles of statutory interpretation relevant to omissions in a statute, see
CRAWFORD, CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES § 169 (1940); 2 SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CoNSTRUC·
TION § 4924 (3d ed. 1943).
64 Dunn, Section 2(d) and (e), 1946 CCH ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT SYMPOSIUM 55 (N.Y.
State Bar Ass'n).
65 In his Initial Decision opinion, Hearing Examiner Lewis applied the Automatic
Canteen principles regarding the burden of proof, saying:
"While there may be some question as to whether the Court's holding in that case
with respect to the Government's burden of going forward with the evidence should be
applied here in view of the manifest difference between expecting a buyer to know his
seller's costs and expecting him to know whether his seller has made similar payments
available to other buyers, the hearing examiner will nevertheless regard the rule in that
case as being applicable here."
But in Food Fair Stores, Inc., F.T.C. Dkt. 6458 (1957), in denying the respondent's
motion to dismiss, Hearing Examiner Hier ruled that Automatic Canteen was not applicable to cases involving buyer inducement or receipt of discriminatory allowances. Balance
of convenience, he stated, was not pertinent when, as contrasted with cost justification
issues, a simple inquiry by the buyer addressed to his supplier, or, if necessary, a subpoena
duces tecum, would disclose from the supplier's records the essential information regarding
allowances. Even if this difference is conceded, it overlooks the risk entailed of impairment
of competition and of arm's-length bargaining. Hearing Examiner Lewis' position on this
point, followed by the majority in Grand Union, is more consistent with adaptation of
Automatic Canteen to national antitrust policy.
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in the tenor of and cites precedents under the Robinson-Patman
Act.
Commissioner Tait's dissenting opinion also expresses concern
that the majority decision makes per se illegal under section 5 a
buyer's knowing inducement or receipt of allowances not proscribed by 2 (d). This, he said, "legislates a new antitrust prohibition" and "is beyond the authority of the Commission."
The majority opinion, however, as applied in the Grand Union
record does not appear to open the door to an overall per se violation approach to section 5. There is nothing in the majority opinion that implies a backing away from the Commission's burden of
proving substantial injury to competition, as exemplified in the
Shell and Socony Mobil cases discussed in another part of this
paper.66
Having construed 2 (£) as not applicable to 2 (d), and having
further decided there is no conflict in statutory policies in equating
the Grand Union practice under section 5 with 2 (d), the Commission majority chose to apply the per se violation doctrine as the
alternative best designed to harmonize the two statutes, instead of
creating a conflict by requiring proof of substantial adverse effects
on competition. Here again this should come as no surprise to
business counsel inured to the per se violation approach applied
not only to 2 (d) but to 2 (c) and (e) as well, as the Supreme Court
has declared to be in accord with congressional intention.
This writer has inveighed against enlargement of the per se violation approach under the Sherman Act and the Robinson-Patman
Act67 and would be among the first to protest its expansion under
section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act. In Grand Union,
however, the Commission could hardly be expected to ignore Supreme Court rulings when its section 5 jurisdiction, so far as the
facts of Grand Union are concerned, is based on an identical twin
of a 2 (d) species the Commission believed to be omitted from 2 (£).
As stated earlier in this paper, congressional amendment is needed
if this per se approach is to be converted into a Rule of Reason
inquiry into the competitive effects of 2 (c), 2 (d) and 2 (e) Robinson-Patman Act practices.
66 See also § 5 proceedings in Roux Distributing Co., F.T.C. Dkt. 6636 (1959) and
Columbus Coated Fabrics Corp., F.T.C. Dkt. 6677 (1959) and my comments thereon, 15
A.B.A. ANlTI'RUST SECTION REP. 47-49 (1959).
67 Oppenheim, Federal Antitrust Legislation: Guideposts to a Revised National Antitrust Policy, 50 MICH. L. REv. 1139 (1952).
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It nevertheless behooves the Commission to be mindful of the
reservations expressed by dissenting Commissioner Tait.68 Apart
from the question of their relevance to Grand Union, Commissioner Tait's dissenting opinion serves notice on his colleagues
that the Commission's own sense of self-restraint may become an
68

One issue of paramount importance still needs clarification by the Supreme Court.

As shown in the quoted passage from Motion Picture Advertising, supra note 13, Supreme

Court dicta state that the Federal Trade Commission Act was designed to supplement and
bolster the Sherman and Clayton Acts, including the application of the incipiency violation doctrine to both statutes. This is an ambiguous statement and may portend an
unwarranted scope of § 5 beyond congressional intention.
As shown in this and other parts of this paper, my position is that § 5 clearly supplements the Sherman Act. It also supplements the Clayton Act but only when § 5 is used
to reach transactions and practices economically equivalent to those particularized by the
Clayton Act but not within its coverage because of a jurisdictional deficiency. Section 5,
however, does not supplement the Clayton Act when the practices arc within the coverage
of the Clayton Act. Resort to § 5 in such instances would constitute a substitution of § 5
for the statutory standards and tests of violation Congress prescribed and specified in the
Clayton Act. Thus, the Clayton Act supplements § 5 but the broad proposition that ~ 5
supplements the Clayton Act is in conflict with congressional intention.
Construing the three statutes in pari materia requires that they be harmonized as a
body of antitrust laws directed toward the maintenance of effective competition. It does
not follow, however, that Congress was indifferent to the differentiation in jurisdiction,
statutory standards and tests of violation in the several statutes.
The hard fact is that in 1914 Congress enacted two statutes. The Federal Trade
Commission Act became law on September 26, 1914 and the Clayton Act took effect on
October 15, 1914. Legislative history supports the conclusion that Congress intended the
Commission to proceed solely under the Clayton Act against transactions and practices
specifically covered thereby. At one critical stage, the Senate amended the proposed
Clayton Act by striking out the sections on price discrimination and exclusive dealing
and tying clauses on the theory they were already covered under § 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act. 51 CoNG. REc. 13849 (1914). Had these excisions been made, § 5 would
have been broad enough to cover the specified practices. The Conference Committee, however, restored the specific Clayton Act provisions which later were enacted as §§ 2 and 3
of the Clayton Act of 1914. See S. Doc. No. 585, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. (1914) on H.R. 15657
and 51 CoNG. REc. 15828-29, 16147, 16154, 16264, 16273 (1914).
Similar specifications were made with respect to the merger transactions in the 1914
§ 7 of the Clayton Act and in the 1950 amendment thereto. Another parallel is found in
the additional specifications of the 1936 Robinson-Patman Act amending § 2 of the 1914
Clayton Act. The legislative history of original § 7 [see HENDERSON, THE FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION, ch. I (1924)], and amended § 7 [see my FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAws, chs. 10
and 11 (2d ed. 1959)] and of the Robinson-Patman Act [see Rowe, Evolution of the
Robinson-Patman Act: A Twenty Year Perspective, 57 CoL. L. REv. 1059 (1957)], substantiate that § 5 was not intended to be used as an alternate to reach what is specifically
within the coverage of those Clayton Act provisions.
When these statutes are construed in pari materia in the light of the foregoing
legislative history, the dicta of Motion Picture Advertising do not support the generalization that § 5 supplements the Clayton Act. Only when there is an omission from the
Clayton Act of economically-equivalent transactions or practices is it proper to say that
§ 5 supplements the Clayton Act without creating a conflict between them.
The reader can trace the origin and repetition of the confusing dicta in Motion Picture Advertising in the following cases: FTC v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643 (1931); Fashion
Originators' Guild v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941); Times-Picayune Pub. Co. v. United States,
345 U.S. 594 (1953).
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important safety valve against propensity for excessive claims of
section 5 jurisdiction.69

C. Section 5 in Relation to Jurisdictional Deficiencies
in Section 3 of the Clayton Act
In several recent section 5 cases,70 the complaints alleged practices that in the aggregate or severally went beyond the transactions
of lease, sale, or contract for sale specified in section 3 of the Clayton Act. In the Shell Oil and Socony Mobil Oil car dealer cases,
the respondents were charged with furnishing lubrication equipment on loan as well as on lease or sale. Beyond section 3's transactions were also charges of making gifts of cash, equipment or
facilities and of furnishing customer benefits such as construction,
painting and paving. All of these were charged to be on condition
that the recipient would handle the oil company's lubrication oil
and greases preferentially.
In the Ice Cream cases the section 5 complaints also included
transactions beyond section 3's ambit in coverage of transactions
or practices. Furnishing of equipment without sale or lease, finanOfl In another class of cases the Commission has issued complaints with separate counts
alleging violation of § 5 and specified sections of the Robinson-Patman Act. The suggested guides for these cases are summarized in the text of this article, infra. The illustrative cases cited below classify as follows:
(I) Section 5 and Section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act: Grove Laboratories,
Inc., F.T.C. Dkt. 6743 (1957) (consent settlement); Oxford Filing Supply Co., F.T.C. Dkt.
(1958) (consent settlement); Maguire Industries, F.T.C. Dkt. 7090 (1958) (consent settlement); Sun Oil Co., F.T.C. Dkt. 6641 (1959) (final order and opinion of Commission)
pending on appeal in the Fifth Circuit; Texas Co., F.T.C. Dkt. 6898 (1959); Southwestern
Sugar &: Molasses Co., F.T.C. Dkt. 7463 (1959); Dayton Rubber Co., F.T.C. Dkt. 7604
(1960); Northeast Capital Corp., F.T.C. Dkt. 7727 (1960) (consent settlement); Lloyd A.
Fry Roofing Co., F.T.C. Dkt. 7908 (1960); Celotex Corp., F.T.C. Dkt. 7907 (1960); LoganLong Co., F.T.C. Dkt. 7906 (1960).
(2) Section 5 and Section 2(d) or 2(e) of the Robinson-Patman Act: Knomark Mfg.
Co., F.T.C. Dkt. 6264 (1955) (consent settlement); Dolcin Corp., F.T.C. Dkt. 6569 (1956)
(consent settlement); Trifari, Krussman &: Fischel, Inc., F.T.C. Dkt. 7119 (1958) (consent
settlement); Longines-Wittnauer Watch Co., F.T.C. Dkt. 7117 (1958) (consent settlement);
Keystone Mfg. Co., F.T.C. Dkt. 7118 (1958) (consent settlement); Marlun Mfg. Co., F.T.C.
Dkt. 7516 (1959); Nibco, Inc., F.T.C. Dkt. 8074 (1960).
In Fred Meyer, Inc., F.T.C. Dkt. 7492 (1959), the complaint alleges in Count I violation of § 2 (f) (knowing inducement of discriminatory prices) and in Count II violation
of § 5 (knowing inducement of discriminatory allowances).
70 Shell Oil Co., F.T.C. Dkt. 7044 (1959); Socony Mobil Oil Co., F.T.C. Dkt. 6915
(1960); Carnation Co., F.T.C. Dkts. 6172-6179 and 6425 (1959).
In Motion Picture Advertising Service, supra note 3, the jurisdictional shortcoming
arose from the nature of the contracts. The court of appeals ruled they were agency
relationships and hence not within § 3, citing Federal Trade Commission v. Curtis Publishing Co., 260 U.S. 568 (1923). Justice Douglas held that Curtis was not relevant because
§ 3 was not involved. In its Brief at p. 25 the Commission confessed doubts whether the
transaction was a sale or lease of the advertising films and hence resorted to § 5.
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cial assistance in money loans, performing or furnishing various
type of services, and the granting of various discounts, rebates and
allowances were alleged. Some of these practices may be within
the Robinson-Patman Act but all were alleged in the amended
section 5 complaints to be expressly or impliedly conditioned on
exclusive dealing.71
Strictly from the standpoint of jurisdiction, it must be conceded that in the Shell and Socony Mobil cases, where the
Initial Decisions of the Hearing Examiner dismissing the complaints were adopted by the Commission, and in the Ice Cream
cases where the Commission recently remanded them to the Hearing Examiner, jurisdiction under section 5 was based on the theory
that it encompasses practices of the type prohibited by, but not
technically within, section 3. In all three cases the practices were
considered on the theory that the complaints under section 5 attacked exclusive or preferential dealing parallel or comparable to
practices within section 3 of the Clayton Act.72
The Commission's affirmance of the dismissal of the complaints
in Shell and Socony Mobil approves the extended Rule of Reason
inquiry the Hearing Examiner in each of those cases made in resolving the issues. In both cases the dismissals were based on failure
of counsel supporting the complaint to produce reliable, probative
and substantial evidence of reasonable probability of substantial
injury to competition resulting from the alleged exclusive
arrangement.73 This has the merit of applying to a section 5 pro71 The original complaints charged respondents with illegal practices only when used
in connection with "switch" accounts, namely, those used to induce a dealer handling
competitive products to "switch" to a respondent. The amended complaints were broadened to include new and retained accounts and only when the practices in question were
used to induce exclusive dealing. The Initial Decision ordered dismissal of the complaint. On appeal, the Commission remanded the cases to the Hearing Examiner with a
direction to receive further evidence. See note 73 infra.
72 In Shell Oil the Commission's decision upholding the Hearing Examiner's dismissal
of the complaint deleted the finding that nothing in the contract prohibited the car
dealers from buying from competitors and substituted the following: "Even so, the agreements, many of which are 90% requirement contracts, on their face indicate the possibility
of a restriction of the market. There is, however, no direct evidence in this record to
establish the probability of the required competitive injury."
73 Among the factors considered and the facts found by the Hearing Examiners were
these: there was no foreclosure of competitors from selling to car dealer customers;
competitors did not suffer loss of business as a result of the alleged practices; certain
competitors who lost accounts to respondent also took accounts from respondent; after
the peak year 1955 there was a decline in new car sales and car dealers; certain competitors
showed an increase in business in recent years; the size and financial resources of respondent do not in themselves justify inferences of illegality. In Socony Mobil, Hearing Examiner Piper additionally stressed that counsel in support of the complaint appeared to
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ceeding a Rule of Reason similar to that applied by the Commission under section 3 in Maico which, at that time, gave the Commission an escape hatch from the constricted Standard Stations
test of violation applied to section 3. Tampa Electric, as our previous analysis of the Supreme Court's opinion in that case shows,
should restore the Maico approach in the Commission's adjudications under section 3. So far as section 5 is used to challenge practices corresponding to but technically beyond those comprehended
under section 3, Shell and Socony tend to foster harmonization of
those sections in a manner that holds greater promise than adherence to narrow interpretation of the Standard Stations rationale
in section 3 cases. 74
contend that competing successfully is an unfair method of competition. "Such a contention," the Hearing Examiner observed, "is, of course, the antithesis of the Sherman
Act.•• .'' He also rejected the contention that lessening of competition in the Clayton
Act sense can be proved merely by showing that the market shares of some competitors
have been reduced. He relied heavily upon ITC v. Sinclair Refining Co., 261 U.S. 463
(1923), which he said was stronger on its facts than Socony, in concluding there was no
violation of § 5.
In the Ice Cream cases, Hearing Examiner Lewis, in a lengthy opinion meticulously
reviewing the evidence and analyzing the applicable law, qualitatively evaluated the competitive effects of the practices. He did not find it necessary to determine whether there
is any valid distinction between the scope of inquiry under the injury to competition test
applicable to § !I and that applicable to § 5. He pointed out that counsel in support of the
complaint had not presented the case "in the narrow frame of reference of the 'quantitative
substantiality' test of a Section !I Clayton Act proceeding" but added that there was no record basis for deciding the question of competitive injury "in terms of the somewhat mechanical quantitative substantiality test.'' At any rate he concluded that the record failed
to establish that "there has been any substantial injury to competition by reason of" respondents' practices.
On March 24, 1961, the Commission remanded these Ice Cream cases to Hearing
Examiner Lewis with a direction to receive "such further evidence as may be offered for
the purpose of showing, for some reasonable time, the extent to which requirements
contracts, 'trade agreements' or other exclusive dealing agreements have been used by the
various respondents, their subsidiaries and affiliates in connection with, or ancillary to,
the sale of ice cream and other frozen products, the identity and location of the customers
with whom such arrangements have been negotiated, and the quantities and dollar
volumes of the products which have been involved in the transactions." The Commission
said that an informed disposition of the appeal requires an appraisal of all aspects of the
competitive effects of the challenged practices.
See also complaint in Swift &: Co., F.T.C. Dkt. 8304 (1961).
74 In another class of cases the Commission has issued complaints with separate
counts alleging violation of § 5 and § 3 of the Clayton Act. The suggested guides for
these cases are summarized in the text of this article, infra. Illustrative are: Fuelgas
Corp., F.T.C. Dkt. 6362 (1955) (consent settlement); Murray Space Shoe Corp., F.T.C.
Dkt. 7476 (1959); Rayco Mfg. Co., F.T.C. Dkt. 7734 (1960) (consent settlement); J. R.
Prentice, F.T.C. Dkt. 7450 (1960); Int'! Staple &: Machine Co., F.T.C. Dkt. 8083 (1960).
See Mytinger &: Casselberry, Inc., F.T.C. Dkt. 6962 (1960). Cf. Brown Shoe Co., F.T.C.
Dkt. 7606 (1959). Cf. ITC v. Curtis Publishing Co., 260 U.S. 568 (1923) and ITC v.
Sinclair Refining Co., 261 U.S. 463 (1923), where the Commission's orders under § 5 were
set aside and where the practices under the additional count charging violation of § 3
of the Clayton Act were held not to be within the coverage of § 3.
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D. Section 5 in Relation to Jurisdictional Deficiencies Under
Amended Section 7 of Clayton Act and Combined
Section 5-Section 7 Proceedings
Complaints in another group of Commission proceedings
combine in one75 or in several76 counts charges of violation of both
71S Barbara Burt assisted me on this topic.
Foremost Dairies, Inc., F.T.C. Dkt. 6495 (1956) (see infra for later developments);
Scott Paper Co., F.T.C. Dkt. 6559 (1956) (see infra for later developments); National
Dairy Products Corp., F.T.C. Dkt. 6651 (1956); The Borden Co., F.T.C. Dkt. 6652 (1956);
Beatrice Foods Co., F.T.C. Dkt. 6653 (1956); National Tea Co., F.T.C. Dkt. 7453 (1959);
The Kroger Co., F.T.C. Dkt. 7464 (1959); and Crane Co., F.T.C. Docket 7833 (1960).
In Foremost Dairies, supra, the Hearing Examiner's Initial Decision ruled that § 7
had been violated but also ruled that the Commission has no authority under § 5 to
proceed against acquisitions alleged in the complaint as means of "the constant and
systematic elimination of actual and potential competitors." Some of the acquisitions
alleged were of unincorporated firms and included asset acquisitions prior to the amendment of § 7 in 1950. The complaint did not allege any specific unlawful acts beyond the
acquisitions. The Hearing Examiner's opinion relied heavily upon prior cases dealing
with the Commission's power to order a divestiture under § 5, a remedy denied by the
majority of the Supreme Court Gustices Stone and Brandeis dissenting) in FTC v. Eastman
Kodak Co., 274 U.S. 619 (1927). Admittedly, as the Hearing Examiner properly stressed,
the Commission's powers under § 5 are limited to those granted by the Federal Trade
Commission Act. The Hearing Examiner's opinion in Foremost, however, does not deny
that the Commission could enter an order under § 5 restricted to enjoining unfair methods
or practices. But the question of the Commission's power as to remedies under § 5 is
not necessarily the same as the question of the scope of the Commission's jurisdiction
under § 5. At any rate, the Hearing Examiner's conclusion in Foremost appears to be
in conflict with the earlier interlocutory ruling of the Commission in the same case. See
note 50 supra and my caveats in the text of this paper supra, which recognize the
still unresolved perple.xities in determining when the § 5 charge is improperly being used
as a substitute for attacking acquisitions covered by § 7. Is § 5 being used to reach transactions economically equivalent to acquisitions embraced in § 7 but where the technical
deficiency under § 7 nevertheless does not bar resort to § 5 on the ground that § 7 and
§ 5 may be construed in pari materia in harmony with congressional intention?
In Scott Paper, supra, the Hearing Examiner dismissed the complaint. The Commission set aside the Initial Decision and found that the acquisitions violated § 7. The charges
under § 5, however, were dismissed. The complaint had alleged that respondent's constant
and continuous acquisitions of companies engaged in the paper and pulp manufacturing
industry and their conversion to the manufacture of sanitary paper produced by Scott,
the dominant maker of such products, violated § 5. These charges were held to lack
adequate support in the record. It should be noted that nothing in the Commission's
findings of fact and conclusions questions the Commission's authority to use § 5 to reach
practices not technically within the scope of § 7. This further indicates the Commission
still adheres to its interlocutory ruling in Foremost Dairies and to that extent the Hearing
Examiner's Initial Decision on that issue seems in conflict with the Commission's position.
An appeal to the Commission in Foremost may throw further light on this difference of
view. Note also the view expressed by me supra in questioning the extension of the
Gra?'d Union rationale regarding the scope of § 5 to practices either not economically
equivalent to those covered by the Clayton Act or where filling a gap attributed to a jurisdictional deficiency is contrary to congressional intention.
76 Luria Brothers and Co., F.T.C. Dkt. 6156 (1954); Union Bag and Paper Corp.,
F.T.C. D~t. 6391 (1956) [consent settlement order affirmed by Commission (1961)]; Fruehauf Trailer Co., F.T.C. Dkt. 6608 (1956); Dresser Industries, Inc., F.T.C. Dkt. 7095
(1958); National Lead Co., F.T.C. Dkt. 7096 (1958); and Continental Baking Co., F.T.C.
Dkt. 7880 (1960).
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amended section 7 of the Clayton Act and section 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act. In seven of fourteen such combined complaints the lack of section 7 jurisdiction over either unincorporated
firms77 or asset acquisitions prior to the 1950 amendment of section
778 explains in part resort to section 5.
In other combined section 5-section 7 complaints the use of
section 5 appears to be based on respondent's commission of unlawful practices other than the challenged acquisitions. In half of
the fourteen combined complaints there are allegations that such
additional specific practices transgress section 5.79 Many of these
additional practices, however, fall within the prohibitions of either
the Robinson-Patman Act80 or sections 381 and 882 of the Clayton
Act. Others seem to constitute charges of incipient or full-blown
Sherman Act offenses.83 Finally, there are allegations of several
types of unlawful practices which do not appear to be within any
of the conventional wrongs covered by the Sherman or Clayton
Acts.84

In seven of the combined section 5-section 7 complaints the
Commission has not alleged any specific unlawful acts in addition
to the acquisitions.85 However, there are indications that the Commission may be using the respondent's intent as a factor for bringing the acquisitions within its section 5 jurisdiction. Allegations
in these seven complaints range from "acquisition for the purpose
77 See Foremost Dairies, Inc., National Dairy Products Corp., The Borden Co., Beatrice
Foods Co., supra note 75; Dresser Industries, Inc., National Lead Co., supra note 76.
78 Foremost Dairies, Inc., and The Kroger Co., supra note 75.
70 See Luria Brothers and Co., Union Bag and Paper Corp., Fruehauf Trailer Co.,
Continental Baking Co., supra note 76; National Dairy Products Corp., The Borden Co.,
Beatrice Foods Co., supra note 75.
80 See National Dairy Products Corp., The Borden Co., Beatrice Foods Co., supra
note 75, and Continental Baking Co., supra note 76. Cf. Fruehauf Trailer Co., supra note
76.
81 Cf. Fruehauf Trailer Co., supra note 76.
82 Union Bag and Paper Corp., supra note 76.
83 See especially Luria Brothers and Co. and Union Bag and Paper Corp., supra note
76. Also see weaker allegations in Fruehauf Trailer Co., supra note 76; National Dairy
Products Corp., The Borden Co., Beatrice Foods Co., supra note 75, and Continental
Baking Co., supra note 76.
84 See especially National Dairy Products Corp., The Borden Co., and Beatrice Foods
Co., supra note 75 (making loans of equipment and non-interest-bearing loans of money,
selling equipment below market value, providing free services and gifts of money, making
large advertising expenditures and hiring key employees of acquired competitors). Also
see Luria Brothers and Co. (monetary loans to induce exclusive dealing), Fruehauf Trailer
Co. (granting special financing and lease terms and providing favorable prices and other
terms to induce substantially e.xclusive dealing), and Continental Baking Co. (cash payments for preferred display space), supra note 76.
sr; Foremost Dairies, Inc., Scott Paper Co., Dresser Industries, Inc., National Tea Co.,
The Kroger Co., Crane Co., supra note 75, and National Lead Co., supra note 76.
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or with the effect of substantially lessening competition"86 through
"systematic elimination of competitors by acquisition," 87 "a policy
of expansion by acquisition," 88 and "constant and continuous acquisition"89 to the general statement that "the acquisitions tend
substantially to lessen competition." 90
There are factors or allegations supporting the Commission's
use of a section 5 attack upon acquisitions in eleven of the fourteen
combined-charge complaints. In three cases91 there existed both
jurisdictional defects barring section 7 action against part of the
acquisitions and also specific additional practices as plus factors for
the section 5 charge. In four complaints92 there were no jurisdictional defects as to any of the acquisitions but there were plusfactor practices for section 5, while in another four 93 there were
no plus factors but there were acquisitions outside the Commission's section 7 jurisdiction.
In three complaints94 where the only apparent basis for a section 5 charge was the fact that the respondent had made a series of
acquisitions, the Commission's use of section 5 seems unauthorized.
Since these complaints do not indicate the existence of any plusfactor practices or section 7 jurisdictional defects, the Commission
appears to be treating section 5 as an alternative to section 7 for
the condemnation of corporate acquisitions.95 This "alternative
jurisdiction" approach is also reflected in the fact that in some of the
combined-charge complaints the corporate acquisitions challenged
under section 7 were also questioned along with the non-corporate
acquisitions in the section 5 allegations.96
86 Dresser

Industries, Inc., and National Lead Co., supra note 76.

87 Foremost Dairies, Inc., supra note 75.
88 National Tea Co. and The Kroger
89 Scott Paper Co., supra note 75.

Co., supra note 75.

90 Crane Co., supra note 75.
91 National Dairy Products Corp., The Borden

Co. and Beatrice Foods Co., supra note

75.
92 Luria Brothers and Co., Union Bag and Paper Corp., Fruehauf Trailer Co. and
Continental Baking Co., supra note 76. See also recent complaint in Campbell Taggart
Associated Bakeries, Inc., F.T.C. Dkt. 7938 (1960).
93 Foremost Dairies, Inc., supra note 75, Dresser Industries, Inc., National Lead Co.,
supra note 76, and The Kroger Co., supra note 75.
94 Scott Paper Co., National Tea Co. and Crane Co., supra note 75.
95 See also Hearing Examiner Pack's indication in his Initial Decision dismissing the
compla~nt in Scott Paper Co., supra note 75, January 13, 1960, that he could automatically
determme whether or not there was a § 5 offense by determining whether § 7 had been
violated.
96 It should be noted that we are concerned here only with questions of jurisdiction.
We do not explore the extent of the relief available to the Commission in litigated or
co~sent set~ement orders _under § 5. as against amended § 7 or 11 of the Clayton Act.
It 1s recogmzed that questions regarding the efficacy of § 5 would arise if the Commission
should confine its complaint to an attack upon acquisitions of unincorporated firms with•
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E. Summary of Suggested Guides for Harmonizing Section 5 With
the Clayton Act in Jurisdictional Deficiency and
Combined Section 5 and Clayton Act Cases
The following guides are suggested for the types of cases (a)
where the Commission resorts solely to section 5 because of a jurisdictional deficiency arising from an omission of a transaction or
practice not ·within the coverage of a Clayton Act provision; and
(b) where the Commission combines in one proceeding section 5
and Clayton Act charges. We have previously suggested guides for
section 5 cases covering only charges of conventional Sherman Act
offenses07 and cases involving only charges of violation of offenses
dearly ·within the coverage of the Clayton Act provisions.98
First, the Commission should proceed against transactions or
practices covered by the specific provisions of the Clayton Act only
under the relevant provisions of that statute. In such cases, proof
under the particular Clayton Act count should be governed by the
statutory standards and tests of violation applicable to that count.
Second, a section 5 count may be invoked when the transaction
or practice is equivalent to that within the coverage of the Clayton
Act but a jurisdictional deficiency bars resort to the Clayton Act.
In such instances, the Commission should sustain the burden of
proving violation in accordance with the statutory standards and
tests of violation applicable to the particular Clayton Act provision
to which the jurisdictional deficiency is pertinent.99

'

out allegations of unlawful practices in addition thereto and should then order divestiture
of the acquired stock or assets. Cf. FTC v. Eastman Kodak Co., 274 U.S. 619 (1927);
FTC v. Western Meat Co., 272 U.S. 554 (1926). See further, note 75 supra.
Compare the consent settlement orders in cases where the complaints charged only
violation of amended § 7 and involving one key acquisition. International Paper Co.,
F.T.C. Dkt. 6676 (1957); Automatic Canteen Co. of America, F.T.C. Dkt. 6820 (1958);
Diamond Crystal Salt Co., F.T.C. Dkt. 7323 (1960).
In considering enforcement aspects, it should be noted that Public Law 86-107, July
23, 1959, giving automatic finality, subject to judicial review, to the Commission's orders
to cease and desist under the Clayton Act as in the case of § 5 orders, negates one previous advantage of resorting to § 5. Howrey, supra note 2, at 184. But a retroactive
interpretation of the 1959 amendment to Commission orders entered prior thereto was
invalidated in Sperry Rand Corp. v. FTC, 1961 Trade Cas. ,r 69,920 (D.C. Cir. 1961);
Schick, Inc. v. FTC, 1961 Trade Cas. ,r 69,921 (D.C. Cir. 1961); FTC v. Nash-Finch Co.,
1961 Trade Cas. ,r 69,929 (D.C. Cir. 1961). See Simon, The Retroactivity of Amended Section
11 of the Clayton Act, 1960 CCH ANTITRUsr LAw SYMPOSIUM 85 (N.Y. State Bar Ass'n).
07 See "Section 5 Cases Involving Only Conventional Sherman Act Offenses," supra.
08 See "Commission Cases Initiated in Complaints Solely Under Clayton Act," supra.
oo We have previously noted in the text of this paper that to the extent the per se
violation approach under 2 (c), 2 (d) and 2(e) of the Robinson-Patman Act is at odds with
national antitrust policy, congressional amendment is required. But compare my comments on § 2 (a) of the Robinson-Patman Act and § 3 and and amended § 7 of the Clayton
Act, supra.
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Third, in all cases where the Commission combines in one
complaint charges of violation of section 5 and any of the specific
provisions of the Clayton Act, the Commission should use separate
unredundant counts which identify with reasonable definiteness
the particular statutory provision to which that count relates.
Section 5 should not be used as a dragnet single count which fails
to give the respondent adequate notice of the ground on which the
Commission claims jurisdiction under section 5 as distinct from
particular sections of the Clayton Act.
Fourth, since the Commission is authorized to proceed under
section 5 against consummated or incipient Sherman Act types of
offenses, this raises no special problem if the section 5 count identifies with reasonable definiteness the Sherman Act type charges and
the Commission sustains its burden of proof according to Sherman
Act substantive criteria and tests of violation.
Fifth, in no case should the Commission use section 5 as a substitute for its jurisdiction over transactions and practices specifically
covered by the Clayton Act.

F. Prohibitions of Unlawful Conduct Distinguished From
Affirmative Regulation of Lawful Conduct
These suggested guides also make pertinent the point that the
Commission has authority only to prohibit section 5 or Clayton Act
offenses. It has no authority under section 5 or the Clayton Act
affirmatively to regulate acts and practices not within the conduct
prohibited by Congress in its respective or interlaced statutory
expressions of national antitrust policy.100 In Sinclair Refining101
the Supreme Court stated a guidepost that has been frequently
quoted in later cases:
"The powers of the Commission are limited by the statutes. It has no general authority to compel competitors to a
common level, to interfere with ordinary business methods or
to prescribe arbitrary standards for those engaged in the conflict for advantage called competition."
100 This does not overlook the initial broad discretion of the Commission in the
formulation and reach of its orders to cease and desist but the remedy must have a
reasonable relation to prevention or correction of the unlawful practices found by the
Commission to exist, else the courts will find an abuse of administrative discretion. See
principles stated in Jacob Siegel Co. v. FTC, 327 U.S. 608 (1946); FTC v. Ruberoid Co.,
343 U.S. 470 (1952); FTC v. Mandel Bros., 359 U.S. 385 (1959). Cf. statutory provisions for
affirmative disclosure in Mandel Brothers, supra, and Alberty v. FTC, 182 F.2d 36 (D.C.
Cir. 1950), where the majority of the court modified the Commission order by deleting
paragraphs which included affirmative requirements beyond the negative function of the
Commission in preventing false advertising.
101 FTC v. Sinclair Refining Co., 261 U.S. 463, 475-76 (1923).
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Chief Justice Stone in Keppel102 emphasized in similar vein
that the Federal Trade Commission Act "does not authorize regulation which has no purpose other than that of relieving merchants
from troublesome competition or of censoring the morals of business men."
There is thus a vast difference between the power vested in the
Commission to enforce the prohibitions in the Sherman, Federal
Trade Commission and Clayton Acts and its lack of power to
prescribe and regulate lawful conduct.103
In the Ice Cream cases, supra, counsel in support of the Commission's complaints under section 5 suggested a distinction between "beneficial competition" as fair competition and "worthless
competition" as unfair competition. Hearing Examiner Lewis
characterized this as "a somewhat esoteric standard" and rejected
it in these revealing words:
"Much of counsel's arguments with regard to 'beneficial
competition' suggests that it is the function of the Commission
to select from among the broad spectrum of competitive practices, having varying degrees of desirability, those which it
deems most wise and beneficient. This, however, misconceives
the function of the Commission. It does not 'presume to run
the economic railroad.' Its function is to prohibit practices
demonstrated to be 'unfair,' not to prescribe 'fair' ones."
CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

My suggestions to bring into harmony, where Congress has permitted, the body of the three fundamental antitrust laws, undoubtedly leave ragged edges resulting from the imperfect congressional
shears. My study persuades me that thus far the Commission has
not shown a spirit of conquest beyond the bounds of its antitrust
102FTC v. R. F. Keppel & Bros., 291 U.S. 304,313 (1934).
103 Pertinent in this connection are the caveats expressed by

Mr. Chief Justice Hughes,
and by l\fr. Justice Cardozo in his concurring opinion in Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United
States, 295 U.S. 495, 551 (1935), regarding the limitations upon the authority committed
to the Commission under § 5.
Senator Cummins, a leading advocate of the Federal Trade Commission Act, said:
" ••• if I thought that the commission which we hope to create would sit down and attempt
to write out an instruction to the business men of this country as to the things they could
lawfully do and the things which it would be unlawful for them to do, there is no power
that could induce me to favor it." 51 CONG. REc. 12917 (1914).
Another leading proponent, Senator Walsh, said in like tenor: "We are not going
to give to the trade commission the general power to regulate and prescribe rules under
which the business of this country shall in the future be conducted; we propose simply
to give it the power to denounce as unlawful a particular practice that is pursued by that
business." 51 CoNG. REc. 13317 (1914).
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authority, although it may not be uniformly circumspect in resolving doubts against its jurisdiction.
In the years ahead the Commission will have the continuing
responsibility of balancing its legitimate claim to a flexible section
5 antitrust coverage against a disciplined disclaimer of jurisdiction
when such expansion of authority is spurious. The line between
the two cannot be drawn with slide-rule certainty. Nevertheless the
Commission initially, and ultimately the courts, cannot avoid the
exercise of informed judgment in separating jurisdiction that is
granted from jurisdiction that is arrogated.
The congressional road map of directions and intended destinations for harmonization of the major antitrust laws does not compel
travel over one statutory road. It would be exaggerating the uncertainties to read the congressional antitrust map as though agencies
of antitrust enforcement can decide for themselves where to go and
how to get there.
A government agency like the Federal Trade Commission is not
shackled with a policy of conservatism. Congress allowed for exploration of new areas within the Commission's delegated authority.
But Congress did not grant the Commission authority for sheer
conquest.

